{"id":165379,"date":"2026-07-31T23:04:01","date_gmt":"2026-07-31T23:04:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.one.org\/africa\/?p=165379"},"modified":"2026-07-31T23:04:04","modified_gmt":"2026-07-31T23:04:04","slug":"ghana-finished-the-imf-programme-now-comes-the-pricing-test","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.one.org\/africa\/stories\/ghana-finished-the-imf-programme-now-comes-the-pricing-test\/","title":{"rendered":"Ghana Finished the IMF Programme: Now Comes the Pricing Test"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

What the IMF’s final review means for capital flows into Ghana \u2014 and why the 24-Hour Economy is the clearest test of whether the country’s improved macro story translates into productive investment.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The headline writes itself: Ghana has exited its IMF programme. That is not the interesting part.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The interesting part is what Ghana chose to do next. Rather than walking away from surveillance entirely, the authorities requested a non-financing instrument, discipline without dependency, a supervised policy anchor with no money attached. That is a deliberate signal to a specific audience, and it should be read as such. Ghana is not asking markets to trust a promise. It is asking them to price a record.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether they do is now the central question. Interestingly, it is not primarily a question about Ghana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Ghana actually delivered<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The numbers are not marginal improvements. They are a category shift.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Real GDP grew 6 percent in 2025 and accelerated to 6.4 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026. Headline inflation, which stood at 23.8 percent at end-2024, fell to 5.4 percent by end-2025 and 5.3 percent in June 2026. Gross international reserves nearly doubled to US$11.9 billion, four months of import cover,  and are projected to reach US$14.1 billion this year. The current account posted a surplus of 7.9 percent of GDP. The primary balance swung from a deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2024 to a surplus of 2.1 percent in 2025. The policy rate came down from 27 percent to 18 percent over the same period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most consequentially for the cost of capital debate: Ghana’s risk of external and overall debt distress has been upgraded to moderate, with all indicators now below their LIC-DSF thresholds \u2014 two years earlier than the programme design anticipated.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two years early. Against a benchmark set by the institution doing the assessing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The restructuring that produced this has also largely closed. Debt relief agreements consistent with the Official Creditor Committee framework have been signed with more than half of bilateral creditors, and agreements-in-principle reached with a comparable share of external commercial creditors. Ghana returned to the domestic long-term bond market in April 2026, raising GH\u00a22.7 billion through its first seven-year cedi-denominated issue since the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme. On 2 July, it settled a US$700 million Eurobond obligation ahead of schedule, US$525.2 million in principal, US$174.8 million in coupon, without drawing on reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A sovereign that was excluded from international capital markets at any price in 2023 is now, in the Finance Minister’s framing, being invited back and declining to hurry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The repricing has been partial and uneven<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Ghana’s Eurobond yields have fallen by roughly 300 basis points since the start of 2026. Fitch upgraded Ghana to ‘B’ with a Positive Outlook on 8 May, projecting public debt below the average for similarly rated peers by 2027.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But look at the full ratings picture. Fitch: B. S&P: B-. Moody’s: Caa1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three agencies, one balance sheet, one debt trajectory, one reserve position, one inflation path, and a spread of several notches between them. If sovereign ratings were a mechanical reading of fundamentals, they would converge. They have not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is the pattern that ONE has documented across the continent through our cost of capital work, and Ghana is now a clean natural experiment in it. The UNDP’s assessment puts the cost of ratings subjectivity to African sovereigns at approximately US$74.5 billion annually, around US$28 billion in excess interest on existing debt and some US$46 billion in financing simply never extended. That second number is the one that matters here. It is not money Africa pays. It is money Africa never sees, because risk classifications made allocation look imprudent under standard investment mandates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghana has spent three and a half years generating precisely the evidence that should collapse a risk premium: fiscal consolidation delivered, disinflation delivered, reserves rebuilt beyond target, restructuring executed, an early bond settlement made voluntarily. The evidentiary burden has been met. What remains is a pricing decision made elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We should be precise about what that means. Where a spread reflects genuine, identifiable risk, a maturity wall, an unresolved SOE liability, an unfinished reform, it is doing its job, and Ghana’s response should be to close the underlying gap. Where it reflects a residual that no fundamental explains, it is a transfer, and it should be contested with the same rigour with which the fundamentals were fixed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why the 24-Hour Economy is the real test<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Ghana’s flagship industrial programme is often discussed as a slogan about opening hours. It is not. The 24-Hour Economy Authority Act, 2026 (Act 1164), assented to in February, established a coordinating body for a multi-shift national production and export agenda. The Secretariat reports US$5.5 billion in Joint Development Agreements signed as of May 2026 within a pipeline valued at around US$11.5 billion; 12 oil marketing companies operating across 268 filling stations; 33 manufacturers on multi-shift operations. The GH\u00a2110 million public allocation for 2026 funds project preparation, viability gap financing and Secretariat coordination, the projects themselves are structured to be privately financed through Ghanaian and foreign investors, with GIIF and DBG in support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is the point that connects this to everything above, and it is not being made loudly enough:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Multi-shift production is one of the most interest-rate-sensitive economic models a country can choose.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Running a plant around the clock means front-loading capital expenditure on equipment, power infrastructure, cold chain, logistics, working capital for continuous inputs, and recovering it over volume and time on thin unit margins. At 25 to 30 percent nominal lending rates, the second and third shifts do not pencil. No amount of enabling legislation fixes that. At single-digit real rates, with a stable currency and predictable input costs, they do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghana’s disinflation and rate compression are therefore not background macro news to the 24-Hour Economy. They are its production function. The cost of capital is<\/em> the policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is also why the energy component deserves more investor attention than it gets. The Buipe solar and battery project (US$1.45 billion, 1,500MW, with an expected 13,000 jobs) is projected to bring industrial electricity costs from roughly 23 US cents per kilowatt-hour to around 9 cents when its first phase comes online in 2027. That single number is a larger competitiveness lever than any tax incentive Ghana could offer. It changes the unit economics of every manufacturer in the pipeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And it is why the unresolved side of the energy sector is the programme’s binding constraint, not a footnote. ECG’s debt stands at around GH\u00a268 billion. The 2026 budget carries roughly GH\u00a215 billion (about US$1.1 billion) to cover the projected sector shortfall, alongside legacy debt payments. The IMF has been explicit that private sector participation in distribution, payment discipline, arrears clearance and lower generation costs are priorities under the PCI. A 24-hour economy running on an unreliable, loss-making distribution utility is a 24-hour liability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where the fiscal space should land<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The most under-reported line in the Board’s assessment is this one: improvements in the debt trajectory have created carefully calibrated fiscal space<\/em>. Lowering the primary surplus from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2026 to 0.5 percent from 2027 remains consistent with debt sustainability, provided revenue mobilisation, public financial management and SOE oversight continue to strengthen, while preserving the 45 percent debt anchor by 2034.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the IMF’s own 2027 nominal GDP projection of about GH\u00a21.81 trillion, that one-percentage-point step-down is worth roughly GH\u00a218 billion in a single year.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is what fiscal consolidation was for. Not austerity as an end state, but the purchase of room to invest. The Board’s language is unambiguous that this space is intended to address pressing development needs and strengthen social spending.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghana hosted the African Union’s Extraordinary Summit on Health. It made commitments there, alongside its peers, about domestic health financing and about the transition from external dependence to sovereign capability. The credibility of those commitments will now be tested against a budget line, in a year when the money genuinely exists. Fiscal space that lands on health systems, on primary care infrastructure, on social protection for the most vulnerable, converts a macroeconomic achievement into a human one. Fiscal space that dissipates into recurrent consumption converts it into nothing at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is the accountability question ONE will be tracking, and it should be the question Ghanaian civil society, Parliament and media track too. The consolidation was paid for by Ghanaians. The dividend should be visible to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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How Ghana positions from here<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Sequence the capital stack deliberately.<\/strong> The temptation after an upgrade is to test the Eurobond market. The Finance Minister’s caution here is correct and should be defended publicly. The GH\u00a22.7 billion seven-year cedi bond is strategically more significant than a Eurobond would be: it rebuilds a domestic yield curve, prices risk in the currency Ghana earns revenue in, and removes the FX mismatch that turned the last cycle into a crisis. Project finance, DFI-backed viability gap instruments and local currency structures should carry the 24-Hour Economy pipeline. Eurobonds, when they come, should be a choice made from strength, not a financing necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Close the data gaps that judgement fills.<\/strong> Rating methodologies lean on qualitative assessment precisely where quantitative series are thin, and qualitative assessment is where geography bias operates. Ghana’s answer is not to complain about methodology but to remove the discretion: high-frequency, standardised, independently verifiable macro-fiscal and SOE data, published to a fixed calendar. Every gap Ghana closes is a gap that cannot be filled with assumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contest the rating technically.<\/strong> There are now institutional channels for this like APRM’s engagement on ratings methodology, the emerging African credit rating architecture, and the ongoing work on the narrative premium in sovereign risk. Ghana has an unusually strong evidentiary case and should make it formally, on the record, with the PCI as the anchor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reconcile the debt numbers publicly.<\/strong> The Finance Minister has stated that debt-to-GDP has fallen to 45 percent, meeting the statutory anchor ahead of schedule. The IMF’s staff projections show gross public debt at 48.8 percent for 2025 and 52.6 percent for 2026. These are almost certainly different measures of coverage, timing, and valuation effects, but investors do not resolve definitional gaps in a sovereign’s favour. Publish the bridge openly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Report JDA conversion, not JDA volume.<\/strong> US$5.5 billion in signed agreements is a pipeline statistic. Financial close is an outcome statistic. Publishing the conversion rate transparently, including the deals that fall away, is the single fastest way to build the credibility that lowers the risk premium on the next tranche. The Secretariat is right that the programme should be judged on investment mobilised rather than public expenditure. That standard requires the mobilisation data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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What to watch<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  1. Moody’s and S&P follow-through.<\/strong> Fitch has moved to B with a Positive Outlook. Convergence by the other two would confirm the repricing is fundamental rather than idiosyncratic. Persistent divergence is itself the story.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. The remaining external commercial creditors.<\/strong> Good-faith engagement is ongoing under comparability of treatment. Full closure removes the last structural overhang.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. The 2027 primary surplus step-down.<\/strong> Whether it is earned<\/em> through revenue mobilisation or simply taken<\/em> is the difference between fiscal space and fiscal slippage.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. The domestic maturity wall.<\/strong> GH\u00a258 billion in DDEP bonds mature in 2027 and a further GH\u00a253 billion in 2028. Domestic refinancing risk is now the more material near-term exposure than external debt.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. ECG private sector participation.<\/strong> The most consequential single reform for 24-Hour Economy viability. Watch the transaction structure and the timeline.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. Bank of Ghana independence.<\/strong> The review’s waiver concerned a breach of the ceiling on BoG claims on government, tied to the domestic gold purchase programme. Watch the DGPP transfer to GoldBod, the permanent end of quasi-fiscal activity, and progress toward the 2032 recapitalisation commitment.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  7. Real credit to the private sector.<\/strong> Nominal credit growth of 19.2 percent in 2025 against falling inflation is encouraging, but the test is whether banks are lending to firms or still parked in government paper. Disaggregate it.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  8. Governance delivery.<\/strong> Enactment of the revised Conduct of Public Officials bill and implementation of the reformed asset-declaration framework. These are not soft issues; they are direct inputs into the qualitative assessments that drive ratings.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  9. Gold price dependence.<\/strong> A 7.9 percent current account surplus is partly a commodity windfall. The structural question is what share of the 24-Hour Economy pipeline builds non-gold export capacity.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  10. Where the money lands.<\/strong> Health, education and social protection allocations in the 2027 budget, measured against the fiscal space created.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
    \n\n\n\n

    The argument<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Ghana’s story is frequently narrated as a rescue: a country in distress stabilised by an external programme. That framing is wrong on the facts and expensive in its consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What actually happened is that a Ghanaian government executed a difficult fiscal adjustment, a Central Bank held a disinflation path, and a population absorbed the cost. The programme provided a framework and US$3 billion. Ghanaians provided the compliance, the consolidation and the political capital. The result arrived two years ahead of the schedule the framework itself set.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The next phase does not require Ghana to prove anything further about its macroeconomics. It requires the global pricing system to update. Whether that happens quickly determines whether the 24-Hour Economy is an industrial transformation or an expensive pipeline of agreements that never reach financial close because at the wrong cost of capital, the second shift never runs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Ghana has finished the programme. The market’s homework is now overdue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    <\/div>\n\n\n\n
    \n\n\n\n

    Lesijolu Eric-Nwabuzor <\/em><\/strong>leads Communications and Influence for Africa at The ONE Campaign (ONE). Alongside colleagues, her work engages policymakers, investors, media and the public to reframe how Africa is perceived, understood and valued.<\/em><\/p>\n

    <\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    What the IMF’s final review means for capital flows into Ghana \u2014 and why the 24-Hour Economy is the clearest test of whether the country’s improved macro story translates into productive investment. The headline writes itself: Ghana has exited its IMF programme. That is not the interesting part. The interesting part is what Ghana chose […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":78,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_relevanssi_hide_post":"","_relevanssi_hide_content":"","_relevanssi_pin_for_all":"","_relevanssi_pin_keywords":"","_relevanssi_unpin_keywords":"","_relevanssi_related_keywords":"","_relevanssi_related_include_ids":"","_relevanssi_related_exclude_ids":"","_relevanssi_related_no_append":"","_relevanssi_related_not_related":"","_relevanssi_related_posts":"161823,164367,161874,161711,162055,162028","_relevanssi_noindex_reason":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"contributor":[],"one_content_audience":[],"one_content_type":[],"one_content_tone":[],"class_list":["post-165379","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nGhana Finished the IMF Programme: Now Comes the Pricing Test - ONE.org Africa<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Ghana exited its IMF programme with debt distress risk upgraded two years early. 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