Policy Brief
Climate change is not a crisis of Africa's making, yet it is Africans, especially the poorest, who are already suffering and stand to lose the most. Not only does it make things harder for those struggling to combat extreme poverty and disease by exacerbating the conditions of poverty, but it threatens to erode the gains that have been made in recent years: more children in school, less people dying of disease, increased food production.
There are ten 'Must Haves' for Africa, and poor people across the developing world, in a new global climate deal. ONE calls on negotiators in Copenhagen to agree:

Figure 1. per capita and total emissions for different countries and world regions
Africa has contributed least to the current climate challenges. Only 3.6% of global C02 emissions come from the African continent (Figure 1). In stark contrast, the continent is already feeling the ramifications harder than any other. There have been severe floods in Zambia and Mozambique, shifts in rainfall patterns in Uganda and huge areas of land are experiencing longer and more intensive periods of drought. These are arguably only the first signs of what may be to come: By 2020 some regions could see crop yields from rain-fed agriculture fall by up to 50% and an additional 75 - 250 million people could be affected by lack of water.(1)
It therefore comes as no surprise that a global climate deal which provides significant new resources for adaptation, and includes ambitious mitigation measures, is of overriding importance for African countries. These resources must be additional to existing and promised development assistance.
African societies will need significant resources to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Adaptation means more than minimising the number of individuals who are worse off as a result of climate change. The gains made in the fight against extreme poverty and disease over recent years must be preserved and built upon. Under the polluter-pays principle, the majority of these funds would have to be generated in those countries that have the highest cumulative historic greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the capacity to pay.
The estimates of annual costs for adaptation measures in developing countries are steadily increasing. The most recent estimates from the World Bank are between $75 billion to $100 billion a year.(2) Investments in adaptation have two key features: First, they are public investments. Second, their costs will increase steadily between 2010 and 2050.
In the short-term developing countries need adaptation finance to kick in now so they can start the work of responding to the climate emergency. We call on developed world leaders to commit to a substantial and entirely public fast-track fund to run from 2010 until the date that a Copenhagen-agreed adaptation fund of between $75-100bn a year actually begins.
Agriculture, health, natural resource management (including forestry), water and infrastructure are the sectors where the need to adapt is the greatest. The obvious overlap with traditional development efforts shows that these new challenges can and should be integrated into existing development cooperation mechanisms.(3) Africa is facing some of the worst ramifications, while at the same time having the least resources to deal with the consequences. Based on the most recent estimates from the World Bank, ONE suggests that at least 30% of adaptation financing for the period 2010-2020 should go to this region.(4)
A number of proposals have been submitted to the UNFCCC by national governments and other bodies regarding the funding of adaptation (and mitigation) in developing countries. ONE urges that, in line with the principles of effective aid laid out in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, any international funding mechanisms for adaptation should be:
a) Sufficient - funds generated are equal to the scale of the task.
b) Predictable - funds are provided in as stable and predictable a way as possible.
c) Equitable - contributions reflect both historical responsibility and capacity to pay.
d) Additional - funds are 'new and additional' to existing aid requirements.
e) Verifiable - funds are collected and disbursed in a transparent and verifiable manner.
f) Implemented easily and transparently - mechanisms that can be readily implemented should be favoured, with transparent governance structures that give all countries a voice and ensure that the poorest benefit.
Whereas it will be incumbent on the main emitters to mobilise the majority of these resources, the delays in scaling up ODA suggests that the necessary resources are more likely to be reached if innovative revenue streams are used in addition to national budgeting. No single financing mechanism will raise the level of funding needed on its own, necessitating that several finance mechanisms be established as part of a global deal. One such combination would include the following elements:(5)
Together the first three mechanisms would raise between $45.5 - 53 billion annually, not taking into account revenues from auctioning under cap & trade systems other than the EU ETS. Gradually introducing these carbon finance mechanisms would allow for a linear scale-up of funding, while cushioning the impact on the budgets in the main emitter nations.
Africa has very low carbon emissions and is therefore often not included when mitigation is discussed. However, there is a great opportunity for Africa to contribute to ambitious global mitigation targets. Africa offers an essential global public good in the form of carbon sinks. The rainforest in the Congo Basin, for example, is the second largest carbon sink in the world.
Mitigation strategies should also cash in on the "clean slate" advantage. Africa has limited energy infrastructure and production combined with rapidly growing energy demands. It will strive to fill the gap at the lowest possible cost: largely traditional thermal power plants. A "sustainable development deal" with Africa will enable African economies to be a global showcase for a low-emissions growth path. This has three components:
These three measures can set the right cost-incentive to set Africa on a low-emissions carbon growth path. This is a smart investment as it will be both cheaper and more climate friendly than reacting once Africa's emissions have reached problematic levels.
1. IPCC, "Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Summary for policymakers". Geneva 2007, p.13 http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf
2. The financing needs for adaptation will increase over time, starting at the lower range of the span and then gradually increase to the upper range. The World Bank, "The Cost to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change, New Methods and Estimates The Global Report of the Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study", Table 25, p
3. Such as GFATM for health, a World Bank - AfDB - EC consortium facilitated by ICA for infrastructure, CAADP complemented by the Global Environmental Facility for agriculture, and REDD for forestry.
4. The World Bank, "The Cost to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change New Methods and Estimates The Global Report of the Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study, World Bank.", p. 5. The World Bank finds that Sub-Saharan Africa needs between 20 - 22% of adaptation financing between 2010 - 2050. However, the figures of the sectoral breakdown (pp. 38 -78) of the report show that Africa will need a higher percentage between 2010 and 2020. Some sectors need immediate attention, as they are affected by changes in weather patterns that can already be observed. Investments in other sectors, that are related to rising sea levels, can be invested in at a later stage. Africa is more severely hit in sectors for which the World Bank study stipulates immediate climate investment needs: health, water agriculture. This brings the figure for climate investments between 2010 and 2020 up to 30%. This percentage might have to increase, if the industrialised countries do not deliver the full amount of adaptation financing. In that case investments in countries with the least resources need to be prioritised.
5. New Economics Foundation, "Assessing the alternatives. Financing climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries", London, May 2009, http://www.stampoutpoverty.org/?lid=10939
6. There are major imponderables like the currency exchange rate and the price of a ton of C02. This estimate takes the C02 price and exchange rates of 2008.
Public financing for adaptation costs should be additional to current and promised Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). In the text of a Copenhagen agreement ONE calls for this to be made clear with the following line:
Climate financing specified in this agreement will be new funding, additional to existing and promised aid flows. Development promises will be kept in full.
Existing development promises must be kept
Climate finance and ODA: overlaps and differences
Transparency of funds
The CDM Executive Board recommendations (Annex 54) to the COP on improving regional distribution should be adopted. Among these recommendations are to increase the use of standardized baseline and additionality benchmarks in certain sectors for CDM project activities.
This reform proposal can enhance the efficiency and regional distribution of the CDM. Standardization refers to the adoption of generally accepted uniform procedures, and is used to enable objective comparison or judgment to simplify and add more predictability to decision-making.
Standardized baselines provide numerous benefits to LDCs:
Although moving to standardized baselines can technically be done now, without any new decisions taken, many issues, including time constraints, lack of a clear mandate from the Parties, and enduring concerns about how and by what bodies appropriate emissions intensity benchmarks, default factors, and positive lists should be determined mean that their development is moving much too slowly. The COP should provide clear direction for standardization in Copenhagen.
The current text recognizes the need for a variety of funding sources, including both market and non-market sources. The text divides the financing needs into two distinct phases: finance for a readiness phase and finance for a full implementation phase. Options for readiness phase financing are primarily defined as non-market or market-linked sources. Options for the full implementation phase range from public funds (option 1) to the use of markets (option 2) to a combination of markets and funds (option 3).
Language for the final Copenhagen declaration:
Parties should narrow the options on REDD+ finance within the text to define a flexible, phased approach to finance that will provide a range of funding sources to fit the various readiness stages . The readiness phase is currently well established within the LCA text, and should be considered an essential element of REDD+ finance. It is important that the sources of finance for this phase are more clearly defined, with a strong role for new and additional ODA - including increasing funds for existing mechanisms and dedicated revenue from the auction of allowances in industrialized countries. Existing mechanisms such as UN REDD and FCPF do not currently have sufficient funding to meet demand. Funding for these mechanisms should be increased and coordination between existing mechanisms strengthened.
A second phase that is frequently discussed in REDD+ proposals is a ramp-up phase of demonstration activities. This phase is not well established in the text but should be included. Finance for this phase should come from a combination of non-market and market sources and should provide sufficient and up-front financing to get REDD+ implementation off the ground. The full implementation phase is established in the text, but should be narrowed and refined. Market access for this phase should be established such that countries can participate as soon as they have the capacity to generate verified compliance-grade emission reductions.
While it is important that the focus of a REDD+ mechanism in the near term remain on the forest sector, it should be designed such that a future transition to a mechanism based on the agriculture, forest, and other land use sectors (AFOLU) is possible. It is our position that a REDD+ mechanism in the near term should include activities that reduce emissions, conserve existing carbon reservoirs, promote sustainable management of native forests, and enhance carbon stocks in the forest sector. Inclusion of additional forest sector activities beyond reducing deforestation and forest degradation ensures the broadest participation of developing tropical forest countries possible, and promotes an effective and efficient REDD+ mechanism at the global scale. Furthermore, conservation of existing carbon stocks and ecologically and environmentally appropriate application of afforestation/ reforestation using native species further contribute to the preservation of highly biodiverse forest ecosystems and may provide additional co-benefits. The overall emphasis of a REDD+ mechanism, however, should remain on the reduction of deforestation and forest degradation, as this will provide the greatest mitigation value in the near term.
Climate change is not a crisis of developing countries' making, yet the impacts of global warming will disproportionately hit the world's poorest people. MORE