Center for Global Development
Julie Walz from the Center for Global Development talks about the organization’s latest report, which ranks countries by their commitment to aid and development.
Last week, at the Center for Global Development, we released the annual Commitment to Development Index -– a ranking of how well rich countries help development abroad.
Though there is clearly a debate about the effect that aid has on development, there is no doubt that developed countries affect developing ones not just with aid, but trade, investment, migration and other policies. Using a series of quantitative measures on seven dimensions, we find that the Scandinavian countries, once again, lead the rich in development-friendly policies. Sweden is top, followed by Denmark and Norway. Only three of the seven G20 nations –- Canada, the United States, and Germany –- were ranked in the top 15 (out of 22).
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ONE’s policy team played with QuODA — a new tool developed by the Center for Global Development and Brookings — all day yesterday.
For the first time, QuODA lets you measure the effectiveness of aid to developing countries across donors by looking at a wide range of quantifiable indicators on aid quality (such as measurements of aid transparency, the use of country systems and donor coordination). It lets you compare 23 different countries and 150 agencies, which means you can even see how different parts of the U.S. government stack up against each other. Check out the comparison of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID and the Department of the Defense in the screen shot above -– pretty interesting!
QuODA is a critical first step to helping track whether donors are meeting their commitments to improve aid effectiveness and -– most importantly — ensuring that development assistance is being delivered in a way that can achieve maximum results in countries around the world. Check it out and listen to the “Wonkcast.”
Another must-read for today, this one from Nancy Birdsall and Sarah Jane Staats on recent rumors of tension in the State Department, White House, and USAID over control of U.S. global development strategy. Birdsall and Staats offer a little perspective:
In reality, the president, the secretary of state and the head of USAID all want the same thing: stronger development tools to fight poverty and promote prosperity to create a better, safer America and world. Key members of Congress stand ready to offer support. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been arguing for stronger development and diplomatic programs to complement U.S. defense efforts.
They then delve a bit deeper into how things could play out, writing:
Word is that a draft of the presidential study directive defines a strategy for global development covering not just aid, but trade, migration, climate change and more; and proposes that a senior development official should have a distinct voice at the foreign policy table, preferably with a seat on the National Security Council alongside defense and diplomacy. That is good.
But what about who will be in charge and accountable to Congress, the president and the American people? We hope it will be head of USAID, Rajiv Shah, and that alongside the presidential study directive, the complementary review managed in the State Department will assign to him sufficient autonomy to do the job well.
Why the head of USAID? Why does greater autonomy for USAID matter? While our three main tools of foreign policy — development, diplomacy and defense — should support one another, they have different means for achieving complementary but distinct ends. First, there are trade-offs between more immediate political decisions (often in the realm of defense and diplomacy) and the longer-term horizons and endurance required to reap the benefits of development investments.
Second, there are differences in how broadly dispersed these tools should be. For diplomacy, it makes sense to have some presence in as many countries as possible. For defense, the goal may be to be in as few countries as needed. Development is somewhere in between. Especially given limited development resources, it may make the most sense to focus on fewer places for bigger impact, a direction the White House review of development policy may be headed.
Perhaps most importantly, there must be some degree of separation between development and other foreign policy tools so Congress and the American people can track and measure development results against development objectives — today’s diffuse and unclear authority makes accountability impossible.
The whole piece is worth a read.
Our readers are probably aware that in the last couple days a successful coup was staged in Niger to overthrow President Mahamadou Tandja. This obviously creates a tricky situation when considering humanitarian aid in the region. Jenny Aker from the Center for Global Development contends that a current food crisis in Niger runs the risk of getting much worse if humanitarian aid were to be cut off.
She writes:
There are both legal and theoretical reasons for cutting off aid after political instability. Legally, the U.S. State Department is bound to suspend aid if a coup occurs. And democracy, at least in theory, is good for economic development – especially if we look at the human rights abuses and economic meltdowns under the dictatorship of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
But reality is quite complex. Whether democracy causes economic development or development causes democracy is a tricky question, and one that has not been definitively answered. We cannot know what Niger would have been like without President Tandja, but its social and economic indicators certainly aren’t much better than they were ten years ago. Malnutrition rates (measured by stunting, or low height-for-age) actually increased between 1999 and 2006, and GDP per capita has remained stagnant. Yet supporters of Tandja claim that he has stabilized the country and brought new investment to the region, citing the 2008 multi-billion dollar oil deal between China and the government.
At this point, though, the debate between democracy and development is an academic one. After drought and pest infestations last year, Niger is currently in the midst of a potential severe food crisis. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimates that 2.7 million Nigeriens (18% of the population) are vulnerable to food insecurity. This means that 18% of the population has already started reducing the number of meals per day or consuming lower-quality foods. When I was there in January, entire households had already started migrating to Libya or Nigeria due to lack of food – a key leading indicator of potential famine conditions.
But the current food crisis doesn’t have to become famine. As I explained in 2008, the combination of drought, grain market performance, trade with Nigeria and governmental and NGO responses (or lack thereof) can make the difference between a food crisis and a famine in Niger.
With so many news reports, eye witness accounts, and images from the region it can seem overwhelming to really wrap your head around what this crisis means for Haiti going forward.
I highly recommend this Q&A with Ruth Levine, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development. Ruth’s experience and knowledge of the region is extremely helpful in placing the recent earthquake in context, and understanding the ramifications of the calamity.
The full interview is hosted on CGD’s site here. Check it out.
Past ONE Blog contributor Sarah Jane Staats has a fun post at the Center for Global Development’s “Views from the Center”. In it, she reflects on 2009 and predicts what will be hot in global development (and what will not) in 2010.
You can check it out here.
On Tuesday one of our partners, the Center for Global Development (CGD), released their annual MCC predications. Each year CGD analyzes the same data that the MCC will use to choose countries eligible for compact or threshold assistance, and provides their own analysis of countries likely to be selected by the MCC.
The MCC evaluates countries based on 17 indicators that fall into three categories: Investing in People, Ruling Justly, and Economic Freedom. In addition to the indicators, the MCC Board will consider the availability of funding, the opportunity to encourage economic growth and reduce poverty in the country, and, if the country is up for a second compact, their performance during the first. Countries are evaluated in two peer groups—low income countries (LIC) and lower-middle income countries (LMIC). Countries that have not previously been selected for a compact must pass the indicators to be eligible for consideration in the compact selection process. Also, countries that are in the process of developing their compacts, but have not yet signed them, must pass the indicators in order to continue with compact development.
CGD predicts that this year the only new LIC country to be chosen for a compact will be Guyana. Guyana has squarely passed the indicators for the last three years, and has demonstrated important policy changes over the last two years. It is also currently in the second year of a two-year threshold program sponsored by the MCC.
CGD named Rwanda a borderline country: it passes the indicators for the third year in a row, but it fails all three democracy indicators, so the Board will likely wait for improvement on those indicators to select it for a compact. Malawi, Moldova, and Zambia should all be selected to continue with the compact development process. Moldova’s compact was actually approved by the MCC last week but has yet to be signed.
In the LMIC category, CGD predicts that Cape Verde and Georgia (despite the latter missing a pass by one indicator) will be selected to prepare second compacts. Both countries are nearing completion of their first compacts, and would pioneer the second-compact process. Jordan passes the indicators and will likely be reselected to continue compact development.
CGD categorized the Philippines and Indonesia as borderline countries as they are unsure how the Board will address their graduation from the LIC to LMIC category. While the countries passed the indicators as LICs, they now fail in the higher-standard peer group of LMIC countries. CGD predicts that the Board will, and should, select both countries as eligible as they have done with other “graduates” in the past.
You can read the full CGD paper here—let us know what you think, and if you like, you can comment on CGD’s blog, too. The MCC Board will be making a decision next week about countries that will receive compacts with FY2010 funding. Check back to the blog for the results of that meeting.
